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The City of New York functions as a kind of oversized experimen-
tal laboratory for the United States. The rest of us watch the antics of
this great city with a mixture of anxiety and envy, both emotions stirred
by the thought that what happens there may happen next where we
live. We have dithered, fumed, and criticized as the city has opened its
doors to immigrants, tossed highrises into the air, bloated its welfare
programs, erupted over decentralized schools and open-door public
higher education, teetered at the edge of bankruptcy and then pulled
back-the last under the tutelage of a mayor who epitomizes the
brassy, confident parochialism for which we have always adored and
loathed New Yorkers. Some may think that Los Angeles has replaced
New York lately as the bellwether of fashion, pop music, and bizarre
fads, but for political theater, New York still leads the way.
Thus it is perhaps fitting that Hendrik Hartog's fine new book fo-
cuses upon eighteenth and nineteenth century New York City to illus-
trate an extraordinarily important historical transformation of our
ways of thinking about city politics, and indeed about politics gener-
ally. Ostensibly, Hartog's Public Property and Private Power' is about
the private property of a public body. This simple statement fails to
capture the true subject of Hartog's book, however, because the book is
really about our vocabulary of "public" and "private"-about the way
* Professor of law, Northwestern University. B.A. 1962, Antioch College; M.A. 1963, Univer-
sity of Chicago; Ph.D. 1969, Cornell University; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago School of Law.
I am particularly indebted to Clint Francis and Ray Soloman for comments and suggestions. Any
mistakes are, of course, my own.
I H. HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER. THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870, at 40 (1983).
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in which, over a century ago, those words became central in the way we
think about cities.
Hartog's book begins by describing a strikingly simple New York
City. For much of the eighteenth century, the city's government was
thoroughly limited in its vision of what it might do, and oddly in-
troverted in its methods for doing anything at all. According to
Hartog, the city's governors focused their attention almost exclusively
on the management of the city's corporate property,2 and even in its
policy decisions- most notably those concerning commercial develop-
ment-the city depended almost entirely on citizens' responses to the
way this city property was managed.3 Perhaps the chief task of eight-
eenth century New York City was to develop port facilities. But the
city undertook this task primarily by manipulating its corporate prop-
erty. In order to pave some street segment at the waterfront, the city
had to entice the upland owner by offering one of the city's waterfront
lots, upon which the private donee (it was hoped) would build a wharf
as well as pave the street-thus advancing two vital purposes. 4
The city governors did almost nothing by the means we would
now think normal, that is, raising taxes and making direct expendi-
tures.5 Citizens were expected, for example, to keep their own streets
clean 6-a duty that they fulfilled, to a distressing degree, by letting
their pigs run about to forage for garbage in the streets.7 So far did the
protection of the public purse go that the wrongfully-accused citizen
had to pay for the costs of his own trial and subsequent acquittal. 8 Yet
this cajoling, miserly city government-far though it was from some
Marxist picture of the state as a monopoly of organized force, or an
Austinian view of the sovereign as commander-was peculiarly self-
confident, secure in its chartered rights and independent property.
By the end of Hartog's story, in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the city was larger in almost every way: more populous, much
more complex and capable in its administrative structure, vastly more
ambitious in its undertakings for public works. This was the New York
City that had taken control of its own street layout,9 had responded to
epidemics by imperiously banning long-established church ceme-
teries-even though it had once granted the land for that very use' °-
2 Id. at 40.
3 Id. at 64-65.
4 Id. at 48-52.
5 Id. at 30-31.
6 Id. at 62-63.
7 Id. at 139-40.
8 Id. at 64.
9 Id. at 158-75.
10 Id. at 71-77. See also Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor of New York, 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1826).
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and had taken over its own water supply and waterworks projects."
But in one vital respect New York's position had declined: the
city's legal autonomy had vastly diminished. By mid-century, New
York's chartered privileges and independent corporate status had van-
ished. In law the city itself had become merely the creature of the state;
as the notorious "Dillon's Rule" of the 1872 municipal law treatise put
it, no city had more powers than the legislature granted, with any
doubts to be resolved against the city.' 2 Perhaps most important, New
York City's ability to manage its corporate endowment, once the sym-
bol and the reality of its chartered independence, was now held to be
just another derivative power, subordinate like all the others to the
state legislative will.' 3
What happened during this period? This is the subject of Hartog's
book. In Hartog's view, what happened to New York was linked to
something that happened to the American legal and political vocabu-
lary over these years. The commentators and jurists increasingly dis-
tinguished between "public" and "private" authority, and, designating
the city a "public" body, subordinated its authority to what came to be
seen as the repository of all "public" authority, namely the state legisla-
ture. Perhaps the most striking element of this transformation was
New York City's acquiescence in it: even early in the nineteenth cen-
tury, the city sought authorization (or perhaps legitimization) from the
state for various exercises of power. 14
One might think this transformation was a purely accidental se-
quence of events, set in motion by the city's serious financial weakening
during and immediately after the Revolutionary War.' 5 In contrast, as
Gerald Frug has suggested elsewhere, 16 one might view this whole de-
velopment as a byproduct of the liberal intellectual position that ac-
cording to Frug eschews intermediate authorities between individual
and state, and hence naturally tends to undermine the communal au-
tonomy of local government.
But another way to interpret the transition that Hartog describes is
to view it as part of a larger rationalization of government in the nine-
teenth century, a rationalization of the sort that interested Max
Weber. 17 One indeed might argue that the invention of a vocabulary of
"public" and "private," along with the City's subordination to the
1 H. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 224-25.
12 Id. at 206-07, 236, 223-24. For Dion's Rule, see also D. MANDELKER, D.C. NETSCH & P.
SALISCH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 83-84 (2d ed. 1977).
13 H. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 259.
14 Id. at 93-94, 97.
is Id. at 90-91.
16 Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1074-80 (1980).
17 2 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 956-69 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1978).
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larger form of "public" body, related to a transformation and centrali-
zation of administrative structures throughout the Atlantic world.
In the eighteenth century New York that Hartog describes, the
city's property-based governance looks strikingly similar to the govern-
mental style that I shall follow de Tocqueville in calling the "Old Re-
gime,"'18 a governmental style dominant in Europe from the late
middle ages to the French Revolution. To a substantial degree, all gov-
ernment in this era rested on proprietary rights and privileges. An
English monarch, for example, had been known to say that as King he
intended "to live upon my own,"'19 reflecting the view that those who
ruled should fund their rule through their own property and revenues,
and not bother their subjects' holdings. Although venerable, this view
was unrealistic, at least in the case of royalty.20 Indeed, in the century
before Hartog's story began, it was the great misfortune of the Tudors
and Stuarts that kings frequently could not "live on their own," al-
though Charles I certainly tried.21 Their inability to govern without the
subsidies of their people-as embodied in Parliament-first cost them
the political initiative, and ultimately a royal head.22
By the eighteenth century, European governments had expanded
their administrative capacities considerably. Nevertheless, these gov-
ernments continued to experience enormous difficulties in raising reve-
nues from their subjects, whose tax liabilities were exceedingly varied,
and whose more influential members claimed exemption from levies
altogether.23 Even in the eighteenth century, governments had to rely
on a standard method of administration inherited from the past-a
method that can be summed up as follows: first, create an exclusive
and lucrative proprietary right to perform some activity, then attempt
to hedge the right with directions for its use, and finally grant it to
someone and hope for the best. Thus Old Regime governments fre-
quently granted a proprietary right in the form of a monopoly over
some function that the governments hoped or expected the grantee then
would carry out, paying himself from the profits of the enterprise.
Clothmakers and charcoal producers (among many others) were
18 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (S. Gilbert trans.
1955). De Tocqueville argues that many of the centralizing aspects of post-Revolutionary French
political life had been present in pre-Revolutionary France, but he also notes the substantially
weaker and more fragmented character of Old Regime government. Id. at 108-09.
19 R. LOCKYER, TUDOR AND STUART BRITAIN, 1471-1714, at 27-28 (1964).
20 J.R. HALE, RENAISSANCE EUROPE 162-63 (1977).
21 C. RUSSELL, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTS: ENGLISH HISTORY 1509-1660, at 37-38 (1971).
For Charles I's financial expedients in attempting to rule without parliamentary subsidies, see id.
at 317-22. See also G.M. TREVELYAN, ENGLAND UNDER THE STUARTS 156-94 (21st ed. 1949).
22 W. NOTESTEIN, THE WINNING OF THE INITIATIVE BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS (1924).
For Charles I's trial and execution, see C. V. WEDGWOOD, A COFFIN FOR KING CHARLES (1964).
23 J.O. Lindsay, Monarchy and.4dninistration, in 7 NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY (The
Old Regime, 1713-63) 151 (1957).
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granted monopolies on the sale of those products, through which it was
hoped that they would keep good order in their industries; 24 the East
India Companies-Dutch and English-received trading monopolies,
to help them fund their enterprises; 25 the original individual or corpo-
rate proprietors of the colonies received the land itself, on the condition
that they would undertake to settle and govern it.26
By the later seventeenth century, British government clearly was
attempting to bring the colonies under closer central control, but this
effort basically amounted to little more than the restoration of colonial
patronage to London.27 In any event, colonies and colonial offices by
no means constituted the only types of "governmental" functions that
were contracted out; so were all the others. Administrative functions
themselves were treated as proprietary grants, both in England and
even more on the Continent. Tax collection positions or military of-
fices, for example, were sold or given out to favorites, as were judge-
ships. 28 The grant of proprietary rights in governing functions of
course defined the very essence of the patronage system on which Old
Regime governments so heavily relied: a kind of monopoly property in
some office yielded the emoluments that rewarded faithful service-but
along with emoluments went governmental authority.
Land, commercial monopolies, administrative office-Old Regime
practice treated these all as species of funded endowments or proper-
ties, thus anticipating modern law-and-economics commentators who
equate property with an anticipated stream of income. These Old Re-
gime "properties," however, yielded not only monetary income, but
political power as well. In a period of decentralized administrative
techniques and primitive fiscal powers, governments simply took the
easiest course by contracting out governing functions to what justly
have been called "co-governors. ' 29 As a result, every ruler in eight-
24 1 E. HECKSCHER, MERCANTILISM 254, 285-86 (M. Shapiro trans. 2d ed. 1955). See also
G.M. TREVELYAN, supra note 21, at 101, 133.
25 For the Dutch, see J.H. PARRY, THE AGE OF RECONNAISSANCE 215 (1964). For English
trading companies generally, see I C.M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD IN AMERICAN HIs-
TORY 28-45 (1934).
26 J.H. PARRY, supra note 25, at 284-85; 1 C.M. ANDREWS, supra note 25, at 259. For an
example of an early charter, see R. HAKLUYT, VOYAGES 279 (I.R. Blacker ed. 1965) ("The Letters
patents. granted by the Queenes Majestic to M. Walter Raleigh, now Knight, for the discovering
and planting of new lands and Countries, to continue the space of 6 yeeres and no more .... 9).
For a later proprietary colony, see ?'The Charter for the Provience of Pennsylvania, 1681," in M.
KAMMEN, DEPUTYES AND LIBERTYES 164-66 (1972).
27 J.H. PARRY, supra note 25, at 285; J.H. PLUMB, THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL STABILITY IN
ENGLAND 1675-1725, at 128-29 (1967).
28 C.B.A. BEHRENS, THE ANCIEN REGIME 50-52 (1967); F. FORD, ROBE AND SWORD: THE
REGROUPING OF THE FRENCH ARISTOCRACY AFTER Louis XIV 105-115 (1953).
29 1 E. HECKSHER, supra note 24, at 255-56. For the term "co-governor," see Gerhard,
Problems of Representation and Delegation in the Eighteenth Century, in LIBER MEMORIALIS SIR
MAURICE POWICKE 123 (1965).
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eenth century Europe, including the so-called "absolutist" rulers, faced
an incredible maze of semi- autonomous corporate co-governing bod-
ies, each tenaciously holding to its proprietary charter.30 The colonies
only extended this manner of governance to distant areas that were
even more difficult to control directly.
It was quite in accord with Old Regime governmental practice,
then, for colonial New York City's corporate charter to include an en-
dowment of property to assist the "corporation" in governing. The
same was true of towns in England. Penzance-to name another now-
famous port town that, like New York, was chartered in the seven-
teenth century-also had an endowment from whose revenue the town
officials carried out town policies.31 To be sure, few other cities in the
colonies received corporate charters and endowments, 32 but few others
had New York's potential as a seaport; it was typical of Old Regime
practice to foster the development of that unique resource through a
grant of corporate status and property to the city.
It was typical too that New York City, in turn, governed by
"spending" its property, making grants to those who would carry out
the city's projects. As Hartog points out, these property grants were not
necessarily a sign of corruption, as later commentators thought; rather,
these grants were the classic mode by which Old Regime governments
carried out policy.33 Parenthetically, the government of the United
States carried out its policies in much the same manner during the
nineteenth century, "spending land" in order to settle the west,34 drain
the Mississippi swamps, 35 and build universities.36
Modem law-and-economics scholars might tell us that this govern-
ance through property grant-essentially contracting out various self-
reimbursing functions--should be the equivalent of governance
through centralized taxation and bureaucratic administration. These
two types of goveranance, however, differ crucially in the degree of ad-
ministrative competence that they require. To levy and collect taxes, to
budget, to undertake projects and police expenditures, would have pre-
supposed a standardized bureaucratic organization that was scarcely in
30 See, e.g., H.C. JOHNSON, FREDERICK THE GREAT AND His OFFICIALS 243, 259-63 (1975)
(Prussia); M. WALKER, GERMAN HOME TOWNS 1648-1871, at 154-60 (1971); G. LEFEBVRE, THm
COMING OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 15-20 (1947) (France); C.B.A. BEHRENS, supra note 28, at
179 (France). The extreme example of territorial and legal fragmentation was eighteenth century
Germany. See Rose, Empire and Territories at the End of the Old Reich, in THE OLD REICH 61,
62-63, 70 (1974).
31 2 B. WEBB & S. WEBB, THE MANOR AND THE BOROUGH 406-408 (1924) (contained in VoL
3 ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1906-1929)).
32 H. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 21.
33 Id. at 45-46, 51-52, 65.
34 Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-180 (repealed 1976).
35 General Swamp Land Act of 1850 (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 982-984 (1982)).
36 Morrill Act of 1862, 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-305, 307, 308 (1982).
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place in the eighteenth century. Such a structure indeed was impossi-
ble on any scale, given a legal climate in which each mini-territory,
notable person, or corporate entity had its own peculiar privileges,
charters, and property.37 Government by property grant, on the other
hand, offered the much simpler approach of lump-sum expenditure
combined with more or less irrevocable delegation of authority.
Hence, in the Old Regime governmental style, property necessarily
carried overtones of political authority. For a thinker like Alexander
Hamilton, who regarded the Old Regime style of corporate co-govern-
ance as imperium in imperio-and as such the very antithesis of govern-
ment itself38-no form of property could have been more dangerous
than the property of a general governmental body like the Corporation
of the City of New York. Precisely that property raised the possibility
that the city would operate as imperium in imperio. Thus it is especially
interesting to find Hamilton appearing in the pages of Hartog's book,
offering opinions that the city did not own the submerged lands near
the New Jersey shore,39 and did not retain proprietary rights in piers
once the pier lands had been granted to individuals.40 Hamilton's
doubts about the city's corporate property were entirely consistent with
his rejection of the Old Regime's pattern of government, where local
municipal property tended to fragment sovereign authority.
In Europe, where the fragmentation of governmental authority
certainly had advanced much further than it had in the new United
States, administrative rationalization was hastened by the French
Revolution. The Revolution's wholesale destruction of local corporate
autonomy and co-governing aristocratic privilege4' took permanent
form in Napoleon's codification of uniform laws and consolidation of a
bureaucratic state42-an example mimicked with greater or lesser suc-
cess all over Europe, most notably in Napoleon's client states in Italy
and Germany.43
The French-led rationalization of government may have been ac-
companied by the view that larger scale governments were the more
legitimate. In Europe as in the United States, the status of municipal
governments became particularly problematic in the early nineteenth
century, not only because of these governments' anachronistic charters
and endowments, but perhaps also because of their small scale. The
37 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
38 THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 108 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No.
20, at 138 (A. Hamilton & J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
39 H. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 115-16.
40 Id. at 120-24. Hamilton seemed to have no objection to the City's exercise of authority so
long as that authority derived from the State's delegation. Id. at 134-35, 149-50.
41 G. RUDE, REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE 1783-1815, at 110-13 (1965).
42 Id. at 231-33. See also I G. LEFEBVRE, NAPOLEAN 151-54 (J.E. Anderson trans. 1969); 2id.
at 160-68 (J. E. Anderson trans. 1969).
43 0. CONNELLY, NAPOLEON'S SATELLITE KINGDOMS 339-41 (1965).
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early nineteenth century was an era of municipal reform, aside from in
France itself, perhaps most notably in England44 and in Prussia.45
While one cannot ask for everything in a book about one city, one mi-
nor regret with Hartog's book is its absence of any comparative mate-
rial on the contemporary European treatment of municipal
government.
In the United States, the emerging possibilities for rational admin-
istration do seem to have been accompanied by a kind of mental asso-
ciation of good government with large, and presumably rationalized
government. That view of government was explicit in the Federalist
Papers, where larger scale representation was depicted as an improve-
ment in the art of government,46 and where Hamilton suggested that
the most able political talents would be drawn to the larger arenas of
the Federal government.47 What followed in the nineteenth century
was the evolution of an extraordinary hostility to cities, which Hartog
here documents in the case of New York, and which Gerald Frug has
documented for cities more generally.48 If "public" administration
were to be rationalized, then the Old Regime's decentralized govern-
mental style, with its grants of property to local co-governing bodies,
would have to cease.
Hence the vocabulary that splits "public" and "private," which
Hartog so ably documents with respect to New York City, equally
works a split in the Old Regime's association of property and govern-
ment. In the modern vocabulary, "property" is depoliticized into the
"private" property of individuals, and "government" is de-propertied
into the range of "public" activities best managed by the large-scale
centralized state. Under the new liberal principle, as Frug has ar-
gued,49 the individual confronts the centralized state, with no room for
the quasi-autonomous, corporatively-organized "intermediate pow-
ers" 50 endemic to the Old Regime polity. In this climate of opinion, the
legal doctrines also tend toward the model that Hartog and Frug de-
scribe: as in Dillon's Rule, the presumption is against local power, and
whatever power a locality has derives from the larger state. An inter-
44 LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE 12-13, 29-30 (J. Lagroye & V. Wright eds.
1979). For a more extensive description of the English municipal reforms, see 2 B. WEBB & S.
WEBB, supra note 31, at 748-55.
45 H. HEFFTER, DIE DEUTSCHE SELBSTVERWALTUNG IM 19. JH. 92-98 (1950). The historian,
Walther Hubatsch, describes municipal reform as the only one of the early 19th century Prussian
reforms that continues to influence modem Germany. W. HUBATSCH, DIE STEIN-HARDENBERG-
SCHEN REFORMEN 148-56 (1977).
46 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83-84 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
47 THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 414 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
48 Frug, supra note 16, at 1099-1120.
49 Id. at 1076, 1126.
50 2 C.L. DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 112 (C.W. Car-
rithers ed. 1977).
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esting question is why the centralization of governmental authority
largely stopped at the level of the individual states in the nineteenth
century United States. The answer may lie at least in part in the limita-
tions even of nineteenth century administrative competence.
The modern attitude of hostility to local intermediate governing
bodies has continued to this day, and to some degree has become feder-
alized as national institutions have grown stronger. Toward the end of
his book, Hartog relates a tale with a curiously contemporary ring: the
sad episode of the Brooklyn Ferry, the monopoly franchise that sup-
posedly was a permanent part of New York's corporate endowment. 5'
By the mid-nineteenth century, Brooklynites were complaining loudly
that the city's monopoly was exploiting them for the city's own benefit.
The city ultimately could not defend its "property," despite the ferry
monopoly's origin in the city's pre-Revolutionary chartered endow-
ment. First the state legislature, and then the state courts, simply re-
moved the monopoly on the ground that the city's extortion of the
helpless citizens of Brooklyn was not a properly "public" use of the
city's delegated authority. 52
There are several modem versions of this little tale of local will-
ingness to exploit outsiders and the centralized government's response
thereto. One version is the set of complaints about "tight little islands,"
the communities that use their zoning powers to exclude the poor and
to inflict the costs of low income housing on their less fortunate neigh-
bors.53 In our day, this practice also has been ruled to be insufficiently
"public. ' 54 Then too, one now sees some effort to control another ver-
sion of local exploitation of outsiders: some states now attempt to mod-
erate the local pro-development campaigns that seem blithely oblivious
to the pollution problems that will be placed on nearby communities.55
Aside from damage to outsiders, modern commentators have low ex-
pectations for local governments' fairness even to their own citizens;
local governments are thought to be especially subject to corruption
and to rule by stable cliques that freeze out minorities. 56 These suspi-
cions have resulted in the recent efforts to control local fecklessness by
subjecting local-but not state-governments to the discipline of anti-
trust suits, 57 civil rights damage claims,58 and court-imposed adminis-
51 H. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 240.
52 Id. at 255-58.
53 Sager, Tght Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21
STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969).
54 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
713,appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (local zoning must take into account the
general welfare of citizens outside municipal borders).
55 For a review of legislative efforts to control local land use actions that have extra-local
costs, see F. POPPER, THE POLITICS OF LAND-USE REFORM (1981).
56 See, e.g., Waggoner, Log-rolling and Judicial Reyiew, 52 U. COLO. L. REv. 33 (1980).
57 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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trative reform.59 It is noteworthy that at least some of these current
efforts would subordinate municipalities to federal law as well as state
law.
Given the developments in legal thinking that Hartog so graphi-
cally illustrates in the case of nineteenth century New York City, and
that seem to continue and expand in the present, one has to wonder at
the extraordinary resilience of local government. In the very prime of
Dillon's Rule, later nineteenth century state legislation and state consti-
tutional provisions moved to secure home rule to localities. Moreover,
as Robert Ellickson has pointed out in a criticism of Frug's work, 60
local governments simply do not pay attention to the restraints that
Dillon's Rule would impose upon them. Instead, they readily dabble
in an extraordinary range of activities that, in today's political vocabu-
lary, we would designate as "private"-such as operating banks, or
selling sportswear and lightbulbs 61-and on the whole, no one seems to
mind except for would-be competitors.
What, then, do local governments have going for them, now that
we make the public/private distinction, and now that we supposedly
have no place in principle for autonomous local governments situated
between the citizenry and the state? Clearly, one thing they have is
their influence in the state and national legislatures, whatever their the-
oretical disabilities. As Hartog points out, New York City could get
much of what it wanted in Albany no matter how weak the City's legal
position was in principle. 62 Second, as Tiebout's famous article reminds
us, 63 local governments give people a choice. When people choose to
reside in one place or another, they are buying into a package of goods
and services, and they very well may want to leave some room for local
autonomy so that they have a variety of packages from which to
choose.
Finally, local government does seem more amenable to personal
participation, and in some decisions-such as those about their chil-
dren's schools or the buildings on their street-people may not want a
centralized bureaucratic decision, no matter how rational. People may
want a place where their PTA membership will weigh with the school
board, and where they can yell at their local zoning commission.64 No
matter how weak the legal status of local governments, then, their prac-
tical status may be considerably stronger.
58 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
59 Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
60 Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1519, 1570-73 (1982).
61 Id.
62 H. HARTOG, supra note 1, at 219, 263.
63 Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
64 See C. PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE 188-92 (1977); Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piece-
meal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 911 (1983).
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Clearly, New York City is far too large to allow for any idyllic
notions of direct civic participation-not that New Yorkers do not try
to participate directly.65 What else does the city have going for it? The
answer is almost too obvious: it has the excitement, the glamour, the
bustle that always have drawn people to the metropolitan potpourri,
and that give the big cities a unique kind of intellectual and emotional
richness. Hartog's book reminds us that New York has been living off
its capital for a very long time, but the city may have more capital than
anyone ever thought. Perhaps when the city can no longer exploit one
type of capital-its waterfront lots and its ferry monopoly-it can come
up with another in the form of its intellectual drawing power. Perhaps,
finally, this intellectual and emotional capital continues to give the city
a de facto corporate autonomy that is not so different from what it en-
joyed in the eighteenth century-a position as imperium in imperio that
the city retains in fact despite its loss in legal theory.
65 See A. ALTSCHULER, COMMUNITY CONTROL: THE BLACK DEMAND FOR PARTICIPATION
IN LARGE AMERICAN CITIES (1970) (chiefly about the Brownsville area of New York).
HeinOnline -- 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 1984-1985
